Do deficits matter? And if so, how? As fiscal imbalances increase, economists debate their effect on the macroeconomy by Stephen Slivinski
As of fiscal year 2009, the federal budget deficit reached almost 
$1.4 trillion, or 9.9 percent of GDP. That’s the largest deficit since 1945 as a
percentage of the national economy. At that time, wartime spending 
was accelerated and the budget deficit was an unusually high 22 percent. 
It dropped to 7 percent in 1946. Since then, however, it hasn’t reached
beyond 6 percent of GDP. 
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As fiscal imbalances
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n late 2008 the U.S. government enacted a number
of spending programs that were intended to stimu-
late the economy and support struggling financial
institutions. In so doing, it continued a practice that has
been common for decades: spending more money than it
collects. The resulting deficit in the budget requires that
the federal government issue Treasury debt to pay for the
spending in the short term. 
This seems like a relatively innocuous practice. As long
as capital markets have a demand for Treasury bills, what’s
the worry? But that question has divided economists for
decades. The recent upswing in the current federal deficit
and projected future deficits has pulled this debate back
into public view.  The prospect of deficits remains high. Current spending
is projected to keep deficits persistently large for the foresee-
able future. The levels of debt that will accumulate are unlike
anything we’ve seen before in peacetime. That will be com-
pounded by the fact that even state and local governments
are issuing debt in historic amounts. The total debt load of
state and local governments has grown from $1.1 trillion in
1995 to $2.4 trillion in 2009. Most of that debt increase —
nearly $800 billion — has been issued in the last six years. 
Economists have made some headway in research on the
topic of how deficits might influence macroeconomic vari-
ables — in particular they have generally rebutted the idea
that deficits alone have a substantial effect on inflation in
the United States — but there remains debate about
whether deficits have any real influence over other variables,
such as interest rates.
With deficits and debt levels projected to be bigger than
normal in the foreseeable future, the question of what
macroeconomic effects deficits can have is an important
one. The analysis done by economists over the past 30 years
has tried to find consistent relationships between debt levels
and certain macroeconomic variables. The results to date
have been mixed.  
Deficits and Inflation
Many arguments have been put forward in defense of 
balanced budgets. In the 1950s, some policymakers worried
that running budget deficits was inherently inflationary. 
The concern was that government spending in excess of 
revenue would artificially increase aggregate demand in the
economy. This was actually a feature, not a bug, in the
schools of Keynesian thought that saw government spend-
ing as a lever to revitalize economic production. But the
counter-Keynesian argument of that era sometimes hinged
on an assertion that counterproductive inflationary pres-
sures might arise out of such deficit spending, while at the
same time arguing that government spending was limited in
its ability to boost real output.
It was hard to tell at that time whether either view was
correct as an empirical matter. After the military demobi-
lization post-World War II, the federal government did not
run large deficits until the 1960s. Part of that had to do with
the ideology of President Dwight Eisenhower, who is
remembered as an advocate of balanced budgets because 
of his belief that it was a necessary component of a constitu-
tionally limited government. As a practical matter,
policymakers on Capitol Hill and even within the Federal
Reserve then regarded deficits as dangerous because of the
inflationary pressures they might unleash.
For most of the decade, a post-war economic boom
helped sustain revenue and make deficits a less likely threat.
The budget imbalances that did eventually arise in the 1950s
were small (usually between 0.5 percent and 2 percent of
GDP) and transitory. Each of those annual deficits was
mainly the result of an economic slowdown that reduced
federal revenue.
Beginning in the 1960s, however, budget deficits became
the norm. At the same time, inflation began to take off.
While some worried about this, it wasn’t necessarily at odds
with the Keynesian view of deficits. In fact, Keynesians saw
inflation as an acceptable cost of the increased output and
employment that would come from deficit spending. 
What’s missing from this simple story is that monetary
policy at the time was becoming progressively looser to sup-
port more government spending and that began to fuel the
subsequent inflation. “The extent to which monetary policy
is used to help balance the government’s budget is the key to
determining the effect of budget deficits on inflation,”
writes Keith Sill, an economist at the Philadelphia Fed. 
Indeed, one of the things that economists generally agree
on in relation to budget deficits is that — at least in the U.S.
experience — they are not inherently inflationary. Analysis
of the history of fiscal and monetary policy from the 1960s
to the 1980s has led most economists to argue that the rele-
vant factor during this period was that the Fed began to
warm to the idea of “monetizing” the deficit. In essence,
that meant the Fed would act to guarantee there was always
a market for Treasury debt. 
The fear of inflationary deficits is most credible today in
small developing countries. Many small developing coun-
tries have central banks often motivated more by political
pressures than by a regard for price stability. But it’s difficult
to determine whether one central bank is more independent
than another or more prone to monetizing the debt. As an
empirical matter, capturing the independence of a central
bank quantitatively is difficult. 
A study in the Journal of Economic Literature by Stanley
Fischer, the current governor of the Bank of Israel, Ratna
Sahay of the International Monetary Fund, and Carlos Vegh
of the University of Maryland offers some insight to this
question. The authors split a sample of 94 market economies
into high-inflation countries and low-inflation countries.
The high-inflation countries were those that had at least one
episode of 12-month inflation exceeding 100 percent during
the period from 1960 to 1995. 
In both sets of countries they needed to find a variable
that would explain the incentive a government would have
to pressure a central bank to monetize the deficit. They
chose seigniorage as a fraction of GDP. When a central bank
“creates” money, it generates seigniorage revenue resulting
from the difference between the cost of producing the cur-
rency and the face value of the currency. (For example, if it
costs 5 cents to produce $1, the seigniorage amounts to 95
cents.) That revenue can be used to pay for spending in the
federal budget. 
A country with a high seigniorage-to-GDP ratio might
be more tempted to generate that revenue when faced with
a budget deficit. That’s what Fischer and his co-authors 
discovered. First, they found that high-inflation countries
tended to rely more on seigniorage to help finance govern-
ment spending. The ratio averaged about 4 percent in
high-inflation countries and 1.5 percent in low-inflation
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is more likely to be accompanied by an increase in 
seigniorage in high-inflation countries than in the low-infla-
tion ones. A 10 percentage point increase in the budget
deficit as a share of GDP is associated with, on average, a 
4.2 percentage point increase in seigniorage as a share of
GDP. In low-inflation countries, however, there was no 
significant link.
The experience of high and erratic inflation in the 1970s
in the United States taught Fed policymakers the impor-
tance of price stability. The 1980s proved that the Fed could
take the necessary steps to tame inflation. The credibility of
the Fed as an institution is essential to maintaining price 
stability. The fact that seigniorage revenue is a very small
portion of the U.S. government’s revenue stream may 
merely be secondary to the fact that policymakers have a
much better sense of what works and what doesn’t in terms
of monetary policy. But keeping the lessons of the past 40
years in mind will be vital to making sure that U.S. budget
deficits remain noninflationary. 
Deficits and Interest Rates
A debate that has yet to be resolved is whether deficits can
influence interest rates. Like many debates among econo-
mists, the different conclusions rest on the assumptions
made and models used.
One type of model assumes that there is a “crowding out”
of investment capital. When a budget deficit is present,
more investment capital is swallowed up by Treasury bonds
relative to a scenario in which a deficit is lower or nonexist-
ent. This diversion of private savings that would otherwise
go to investment makes the remaining available capital more
valuable. That drives up the rate of return necessary for com-
peting investment options (including Treasury bills) to
remain attractive. Hence, a rise in interest rates. 
This is the main story told in a few papers co-authored by
Peter Orszag, formerly of the Brookings Institution and 
currently the director of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget. For example, a widely cited 2004 study he 
co-authored with Brookings colleague William Gale comes
to the general conclusion that deficits do raise interest rates.
The estimates they arrive at suggest that the strongest
effects pertain mainly to anticipated future deficits: Every 
1 percent increase in the projected budget deficit raises long-
term interest rates by 25 to 35 basis points. 
Another element that bears on whether deficits affect
the conversion of available savings into investment capital
also happens to be one of the most controversial. It comes
from the assumptions made about how people in the present
view deficits relative to their (or their children’s) expected
income in the future. The notion of “Ricardian equivalence”
— advanced by Robert Barro of Harvard University and
based on an insight from the early 19th century economist
David Ricardo — is the phenomenon that, when faced 
with the knowledge that the federal deficit will grow, people
today will save more to account for the fact that they or 
their children will face higher taxes in the future to pay 
off the debt. As Michael Pakko, an economist at the St. Louis
Fed, explains, under the assumptions of “a closed economy
with rational, forward-looking consumers, Ricardian equiva-
lence suggests that deficits have no effect at all.” The money
borrowed from the public by the government is exactly offset
by new savings. 
The logical extension of this idea is that interest rates
wouldn’t have to move to equilibrate capital markets as they
would in a world where the crowding out occurred. Yet,
when economists have set out to identify episodes of
Ricardian equivalence, they have had trouble finding them.
Martin Feldstein of Harvard University has suggested that
the planned bequests that underlie the logic of the phenom-
enon aren’t all that common. That shouldn’t be surprising,
he argued in a 2004 speech, “in an economy in which 
economic growth raises the incomes of future generations so
that even an altruistic parent sees no need to reduce his own
consumption in order to raise the consumption of his adult
children after he has died.” 
Although the conditions under which Ricardian equiva-
lence holds are quite restrictive, some economists maintain
that it is a useful baseline against which to measure the
effect of deficit finance on the economy. During the past 25
years, many studies have arrived at the conclusion that there 
doesn’t seem to be much connection between interest rate
movements and debt over the long term. In an influential
study, Eric Engen of the Federal Reserve Board and R. Glenn
Hubbard of Columbia University argue that a better way of
viewing the matter isn’t to try to find correlations with year-
to-year deficits. Instead, the level of government debt as a
whole is the factor that has the best chance of influencing
interest rates. Even then they find a much smaller effect, 
an increase of two to three basis points for every 1 percent
increase in federal debt as a percentage of GDP.
There are a number of reasons this result might strike
someone as unsurprising even if Ricardian equivalence 
isn’t assumed. A wide variety of factors can influence the
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15determination of interest rates and it is difficult to empiri-
cally tease out exactly which interest rate movements are
related to increasing debt levels and which are not.
Additionally, the debt incurred by the federal government
over the past 50 years has been consistently smaller than 
the aggregate debt incurred by businesses, households, and
state and local governments.  
Another factor that has renewed skepticism about the
effect of deficits on interest rates is the volume of capital
from foreign trading partners that has flowed into the coun-
try, particularly from those countries with which the United
States has a trade deficit, such as Japan and China. As Pakko
notes, “the demand for U.S. Treasury securities by foreigners
is likely to have mitigated upward pressure on interest rates
that might otherwise have been observed.”  
Are All Deficits Created Equal?
None of the research so far is meant to suggest that debt and
deficits can be run up indefinitely without consequence. 
As Feldstein argues, for instance, seeing little reaction by
interest rates to deficits shouldn’t imply that deficits don’t
reduce national savings. Instead, he argues that the capital
inflow from abroad is evidence that deficits can lower 
savings rates in the United States. A country with “a low 
saving rate imports capital,” he notes, and that’s what has
happened. He concludes that deficits “reduce national 
saving and capital formation. That lowers the growth rate
for a long period of time and permanently lowers the level of
real income and the real standard of living.”
Part of this argument depends on what creates the deficit
in the first place. For example, small deficits that are the
result of business cycles are generally not damaging.
Revenues dry up while spending remains constant. The 
stabilizing effect these sorts of deficits may have on the
economy may even be desirable. 
What many textbook models seem to miss is how the
revenue stream that can pay off the debt is structured. Some
economists have pointed out that the current tax code is
heavily biased against capital formation. Raising taxes in
their current form to cover budget shortfalls may be quite
damaging if the deficits are large. The adverse effects that
deficits may have, argues Feldstein, “is reinforced by the
deadweight loss that results from the need to raise substan-
tial amounts of revenue to service the national debt.” 
That deadweight loss — or, the investments foregone
because of how the tax system is structured — can be 
exacerbated further by the tax code’s penalization of capital
formation relative to consumption.
Of greater consequence than today’s deficits are the per-
manent structural deficits that may persist and grow over
time. The terms popularly used to discuss budget deficits are
simply cash-flow identities for the near term: Count the
money in and the money out and find the difference. This
operation doesn’t account for the assets on the federal books
nor does it account for the future liabilities of the benefits
promised to retirees through Social Security, Medicare, and
other entitlement programs. These systems are considered
pay-as-you-go programs in which benefits are financed by
current-year taxation. Over time, however, the demographic
reality is that the tax base will shrink relative to the number
of retirees. 
The gap between the estimated tax collections and the
benefits to be paid, in present value terms, are enormous —
much larger, in fact, than the current federal debt of about
$13 trillion today. Economist Laurence Kotlikoff of Boston
University estimates that the total unfunded liabilities of the
federal government are in excess of $70 trillion today. It is
these much larger dollar amounts that have many econo-
mists worried. These numbers may indeed be large enough
to spur future macroeconomic effects of the sort that some
have feared since the 1980s. 
These larger deficits in entitlement programs can be
viewed from this perspective as a byproduct of an institu-
tional problem that requires a structural solution. But it
remains to be seen what form that change will take and
when. Most deficits to this point haven’t been large enough
to prompt policy action, except on the rare occasion when
the Social Security trust fund was on the verge of falling into
deficit in the early 1980s and both the payroll tax and the
retirement age were raised to remedy the problem. 
How policymakers will deal with the threats posed by
these unfunded liabilities remains uncertain. Until that
time, economists have once again picked up a debate over
the theoretical models and empirical analysis that is likely to
provide a useful framework to weigh policy options when
the demand for structural change finally materializes.      RF
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